' preferences are strict and can be represented by additively separable utility functions. The core may be empty. The strict core … no Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof social choice rule. We also show that the core may be …

it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice”) which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good … interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only under very special conditions. But we show in this note that corner …

match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least number of compatible pairs. We extend the celebrated Gallai …

mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes involving matching …