We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that … limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This … alters the individuals’ demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of …

We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain future bequest needs. An … individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often uncertain about the future financial needs of his or her …. We derive two equivalent long-term life insurance contracts that are incentive compatible and achieve a higher welfare …

We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information …

of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, because the income tax trades o¤ incentives and insurance … weight of the talented types is sufficiently high. The second-best optimal graduate tax provides incomplete insurance because …