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Uncertain Bequest Needs and Long-Term Insurance Contracts

Fei, Wenan; Fluet, Claude; Schlesinger, Harris - CESifo - 2008

We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain future bequest needs. An … individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often uncertain about the future financial needs of his or her …. We derive two equivalent long-term life insurance contracts that are incentive compatible and achieve a higher welfare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405924

A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

Mimra, Wanda; Wambach, Achim - CESifo - 2011

We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914286

Remittances, Banking Status and the Usage of Insurance Schemes

Crayen, Dorothee; Hainz, Christa; Martinez, Christiane … - CESifo - 2010

can be used to self-insure, substituting for both formal and informal insurance. We investigate this question using a … remittances, which supports the idea that remittances act as (self-) insurance. We also show that purchasing formal funeral cover … is influenced by other risk management strategies and that determinants of informal insurance differ from those of formal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572573

Optimal Wage Redistribution in the Presence of Adverse Selection in the Labor Market

Bastani, Spencer; Blumkin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca - CESifo - 2014

In this paper we allude to a novel role played by the non-linear income tax system in the presence of adverse selection in the labor market due to asymmetric information between workers and firms. We show that an appropriate choice of the tax schedule enables the government to affect the wage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888445

Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection

Siemens, Ferdinand von; Kosfeld, Michael - CESifo - 2014

Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team’s performance and therefore on their colleagues’ productivity. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743453

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2008

A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094231

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M. - CESifo - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds. An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765762

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2009

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534061

Wage Dispersion and Labor Turnover with Adverse Selection

Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Kaas, Leo - CESifo - 2011

We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293483

Loans, Insurance and Failures in the Credit Market for Students

Rey, Elena Del; Verheyden, Bertrand - CESifo - 2011

In the education literature, it is generally acknowledged that both credit and insurance for students are rationed. In … insurance. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914272