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Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru - CESifo - 2014

This paper studies collective contests with endogenous cost sharing, general effort costs and intra-group heterogeneity …-sharing selective incentives. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877824

Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contests

Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru - CESifo - 2013

Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607470

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - CESifo - 2011

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150636

When is Voting Optimal?

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - CESifo - 2014

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011097945

Social Identity and Voter Turnout

Ben-Bassat, Avi; Dahan, Momi - CESifo - 2008

This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of social identity on voter turnout. We first show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other candidates. Using last name as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405976

International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined

Garfinkel, Michelle R.; Skaperdas, Stergios; … - CESifo - 2009

prices, free trade can intensify arming incentives to such an extent that the additional security costs swamp the traditional … resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade … stronger tendency for arming incentives to be equalized and thus for a “leveling of the playing field.” Depending on world …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979423

Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests

Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2013

This paper evaluates direct and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants’ prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723527

Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments

Feld, Lars P.; Kirchgässner, Gebhard; Schaltegger, … - CESifo - 2003

According to the Leviathan-Model, fiscal federalism is seen as a binding constraint on a revenue-maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism is supposed to reduce public sector size as compared to unitary states. However, empirical results concerning the Leviathan...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766067

Equity and Effectiveness of Optimal Taxation in Contests under an All-Pay Auction

Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2012

The means of contest design may include differential taxation of the prize. This paper establishes that, given a revenue-maximizing contest designer who faces a balanced-budget constraint, the optimal taxation scheme corresponding to an all-pay auction is appealing in two senses. First, it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645631

The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2012

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595384