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Individual and Developmental Differences in the Relationship of Preferences and Theory of Mind
Leipold, Kristina; Vetter, Nora C.; Dittrich, Marcus; … - CESifo - 2012
of the same type better than cooperative adolescents. Adolescents show lower cooperation levels and a slower adaption of … examined in a large sample whether being a cooperative preference type is related with better theory of mind skills … Public Goods Game. Results indicate that the cooperative type predicted other players. preference types more accurately in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877849
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The Carbon-Budget Approach to Climate Stabilization: Cost-Effective Subglobal versus Global Action
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - CESifo - 2010
stock of fossil fuels we compare the cooperative cost-effective policy with the unilateral cost-effective policy of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727298
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Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2006
frequently as well as that institution formation has a positive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406364
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Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation
Brekke, Kjell Arne; Hauge, Karen Evelyn; Lind, Jo Thori; … - CESifo - 2009
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979399
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Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457
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Negotiating to Avoid "Gradual" versus "Dangerous" Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014
According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734324
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Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes
Barrett, Scott - CESifo - 2012
If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries’ behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877724
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Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations
Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2009
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013056
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Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups
Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2007
positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094348
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Innovation Strategies in a Competitive Dynamic Setting
Lukach, Ruslan; Plasmans, Joseph; Kort, Peter M. - CESifo - 2005
planner prefer the R&D-cooperative strategy over the competitive one regardless of the intensity of knowledge spillovers … venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094393