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the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in … states of the game, the "tipping states", which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths, their distances to … by which the allocation of prizes are governed by possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196321
, we show that substituting the auction contest success function for the lottery contest success function in a conflict may … radicals. Our results demonstrate the importance of the choice of the institutions of conflict, as modeled by the contest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547898
In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011242157
all-pay auction is appealing in two senses. First, it ensures exceptional equitable final prize valuations. Second, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645631
can reverse a country’s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict …. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979423
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and analyze how each group’s internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103399
I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants …. There exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the third party’s intervention worsens the conflict by energizing her ally … to withdraw from or stay in the conflict is based on her prior beliefs and not on the current conditions of the conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034639
such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094272
Contests between groups are plagued by intra-group externalities (freeriding). Yet, costless incentive schemes that entirely avoid free-riding within a group might not be desirable, neither individually nor socially. In contests among two groups, a relatively weak (i.e., small or unproductive)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498991
We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the …, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases … of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416114