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A Theory of Tax Avoidance - Managerial Incentives for Tax Planning in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - CESifo - 2014
We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786744
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Corporate Deductibility Provisions and Managerial Incentives
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - CESifo - 2013
findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732350
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Corporate Taxation and Corporate Governance
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - CESifo - 2009
behavior is however crucially influenced by diverging interests between shareholders and managers. We set up an agency model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572510
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The Effect of Corporate Taxation and Ownership on Raising Shareholder Capital
Krämer, Robert; Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2013
model with strategic interaction between managers and outside shareholders, we hypothesize that, while an increase in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701082
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A Negotiation-Based Model of Tax-Induced Transfer Pricing
Becker, Johannes; Davies, Ronald B. - CESifo - 2014
We present a new model of tax induced transfer pricing as an alternative to the oft-used concealment model. Inspired by interviews with practitioners, we consider a large multinational firm which is audited by the tax authority in the high-tax location. When this country adjusts the transfer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877753
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International Debt Shifting: Do Multinationals Shift Internal or External Debt?
Møen, Jarle; Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm; … - CESifo - 2011
Multinational companies can exploit the tax advantage of debt more aggressively than national companies by shifting debt from affiliates in low tax countries to affiliates in high tax countries. Previous papers have either omitted internal debt or external debt from the analysis. We are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009221552
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Learning from the Past: Trends in Executive Compensation over the Twentieth Century
Frydman, Carola - CESifo - 2008
with the evolution in executive pay and the market for managers during earlier time periods. A case study of General …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405726
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Rhineland Exit?
Bovenberg, Lans; Teulings, Coenraad N. - CESifo - 2008
We argue in favor of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle about the ultimate goal of the company....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405829
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Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th Century British Banks
Grossman, Richard S.; Imai, Masami - CESifo - 2014
This paper utilizes data on the presence of prominent individuals—that is, those with political (e.g., Members of Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to investigate whether the appointment of well-connected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099763
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Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring
Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - CESifo - 2004
Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage …. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their … using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243