post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex …

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market … game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of … ratio offered is selected as the winner of the auction. We model the decision process as based on a general noisy ranking of …

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement … – that an intransparent negotiation yields a higher buyer surplus than a transparent auction for a range of parameters. In …

productivity and their social preferences. This paper presents causal evidence that they do. In a real-effort experiment, we elicit …