countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

only the material, economic welfare costs of conflict stemming from the altered path of consumption resulting from conflict …-peaceful world. But how much would individual be willing to pay to avoid just the economic costs of conflict? Remarkably, even these … pure economic welfare losses from conflict are quite large. I find that, on average, individuals who live in a country that …

can reverse a country’s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict …. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of …

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and analyze how each group’s internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

based on neighborly recognition of borders could deliver a desired low-conflict situation if accompanied by an optional …