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A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups

Brandauer, Stefan; Englmaier, Florian - CESifo - 2006

We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406314

External Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union: Bailouts and the Role of Corruption

Achury, Carolina; Koulovatianos, Christos; Tsoukalas, … - CESifo - 2011

We build a tractable stylized model of external sovereign debt and endogenous international interest rates. In corrupt economies with rent-seeking groups stealing public resources, a politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by permanent fiscal impatience which leads to excessive issuing of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009228617

Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - CESifo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103399

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Dan Kovenock J.; Sheremeta, … - CESifo - 2009

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034634

Socially-Tolerable Discrimination

Amegashie, J. Atsu - CESifo - 2008

History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094272

A Market for Connections

Miettinen, Topi; Poutvaara, Panu - CESifo - 2012

Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548151

Can Lower Tax Rates be Bought? Business Rent-Seeking and Tax Competition among U.S. States

Chirinko, Robert S.; Wilson, Daniel J. - CESifo - 2010

allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be influenced by the rent-seeking (lobbying) behavior of businesses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572511

Politics and Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation

Eicher, Theo; Osang, Thomas - CESifo - 2001

In this paper we examine the empirical relevance of three prominent endogenous protection models. Is protection for sale, or do altruistic policy makers worry about political support? We find strong evidence that protection is indeed "for sale." The important new result is, however, that not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406003

Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - CESifo - 2009

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework casting some lights on the drawbacks of bicameral state legislatures and on the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979403

The Political Economy of Pricing Car Access to Downtown Commercial Districts

Borger, Bruno De; Russo, Antonio - CESifo - 2015

studies how lobbying by both groups shapes the government’s policy. We find that downtown retailers typically have steeper … lobbying contribution schedules than superstores, which induces the government to underprice central roads and parking spaces …, extending the model to allow for lobbying by residents within the downtown retail district we find that residents may lobby for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257673