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An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - CESifo - 2014

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877664

Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010

characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724

The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms

Tillio, Alfredo Di; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - CESifo - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889983

Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts

Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2013

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882

Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on EBay

Bolton, Gary E.; Ockenfels, Axel - CESifo - 2008

We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading system provides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181559

On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods

Bierbrauer, Felix - CESifo - 2009

The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979415

On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation

Bierbrauer, Felix - CESifo - 2010

The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671704

Minimum Participation Rules for the Provision of Public Goods

Gerber, Anke; Neitzel, Jakob; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - CESifo - 2012

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645648

Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games

Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin - CESifo - 2011

Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people will be able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395307

Implementing Efficient Market Structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405905