A model of location choice by Cournot oligopolists is presented, under the assumption that R&D spillovers depend on the distance between firms. We show that a variety of patterns emerge. Agglomeration is optimal under certain assumptions. Geographical dispersion in a two-dimensional plane is...

We provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. The contraction mapping approach is used. Equilibrium is characterized in terms of marginal costs. The result is useful for applications to two-stage games, where, in the first stage, firms incur costs to...

This paper analyzes a class of two-stage Cournot games where rival firms, in the first stage, incur real resource costs in jointly manipulating their marginal costs of production, so as to influence the outcome of game they want to play in the second stage. Marginal costs may be manipulated by...

We derive emission tax rules that take into account (i) the rent-shifting argument, (ii) the need to mitigate transboundary pollution, (iii) correction for restrictive oligopoly output, and (iv) correction for domestic coordination of outputs. We show that trade liberalization does not...

We show that when polluting firms are Cournot oligopolists, they may have an incentive to use the market of pollution permits as a means of indirectly coordinating their outputs. If firms are initially identical, trade in pollution permits may result in an asymmetric oligopoly. The case where...

This paper offers an explanation of the fact that some foreign firms are favored at the expense of others, and characterizes the distribution of favors in terms of the cost parameters of firms, and a preference parameter in the government's objective function. We present a model where favors...