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Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949

Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare

HINDRIKS, Jean; LOCKWOOD, Ben - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analyzing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043539

Divided Government and Dominance Solvability.

Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634077

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption …-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory … without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008244

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public … institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public … corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043278

Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.

Bloch, F.; Rottier, S. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947

Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2002

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its break-up into smaller countries leads to aggregate utility loss. We show that in an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042827

The stability threshold and two facets of polarization

HAIMANKO, Ori; LE BRETON, Michel; WEBER, Shlomo - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

In this paper we introduce the stability threshold that quantifies the minimal returns to size sufficient to prevent credible secession threats by regions of the country. Severity of internal tension has been linked to degree of polarization of citizens' preferences and characteristics. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065281

Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem

Horner, Johannes; Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511592

Learning to Disagree in a Game of Experimentation

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We analyse strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” With hidden actions, there exists a unique equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. This randomization induces belief disagreement on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011203001

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