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Korruptionsprävention : klassische und ganzheitliche Ansätze

Stark, Carsten (ed.) - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011629350

Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949

Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare

HINDRIKS, Jean; LOCKWOOD, Ben - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043539

Divided Government and Dominance Solvability.

Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634077

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption …-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory … without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008244

Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth

DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public … institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public … corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043278