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Lobbying in Public Decision Making.
Jehiel, P.; Thisse. J.-F. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001
The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented thei most-prefered policy. Further more, the government may influence the lobbying process itself by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-off :...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478949
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Decentralization and electoral accountability: incentives, separation, and voter welfare
HINDRIKS, Jean; LOCKWOOD, Ben - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005
incumbent can divert rents in some regions without this being detected by voters in other regions (selective rent diversion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043539
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Divided Government and Dominance Solvability.
Iannantuoni, G. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999
Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634077
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Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions
DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006
Corruption is thought to prevent poor countries from catching-up. We analyze one channel through which corruption …-seeking. At equilibrium, the intensity of corruption and the structure of public investment are determined by the predatory … without corruption in which there is no effective corruption yet still the possibility of corruption distorts the allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008244
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Democracy, rule of law, corruption incentives and growth
DE LA CROIX, David; DELAVALLADE, Clara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008
We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public … institutional parameters: the "technology of corruption" is the ease with which rent-seekers can capture a proportion of public … corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043278
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Panorama de la gestión pública en América Latina y el Caribe : un gobierno abierto centrado en el ciudadano
Vereinte Nationen / Economic Commission for Latin … - 2018
El emergente paradigma del gobierno abierto se postula como un enfoque renovado para la reforma del Estado y la modernización de la administración pública, a partir de una nueva forma de articular iniciativas relacionadas con la transparencia, la rendición de cuentas, la participación...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011974386
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The impact of minimum wages on hours and employment revisited
STROBL, Eric; WALSH, Frank - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004
Using a standard production function the equilibrium hours per worker wage locus is shown to be u-shaped in a competitive labour market. A minimum wage mayth us either increase or decrease hours per worker and, by extension, the number of workers. We provide supporting evidence for this using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008210
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Dealing with monopsony power: the case for using employment subsidies
STROBL, Eric; WALSH, Frank - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
We show in a monopsony model that a minimum wage may raise hours which are already too high but has ambiguous effects on the number of employees and utility. Employment subsidies, in contrast, unambiguously improve worker utility and bring the market equilibrium closer to the efficient outcome.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043266
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Estimating the shirking model with variable effort
STROBL, Eric; WALSH, Frank - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003
We show in a theoretical efficiency wage model where firms differ in monitoring intensity or in the effort intensity of their technologies that the impact of monitoring intensity on wages is ambiguous, a result that mirrors evidence from the empirical literature. We argue that to correctly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005065382