We consider social insurance schemes with a two-part benefit formula: a flat (constant) term and a variable term which is proportional to individuals' contributions. The factor of proportionality defines the type of social insurance. We adopt a two-stage political economy approach. At the first,...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical evaluation of theoretical modelshowing that shifting from pay-as-you-go to funded social security schemes can be made Pareto-improving. Further, it argues that what often makes a reform toward funded schemes attractive is a number of additional...

This paper analyses the interaction between comparative advantages, social protection and the political system.

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In such a setting, a (redistributive) Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth .

It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security system implies a welfare loss for the trasition generation, that is the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for this own retirement and second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired...