This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative...

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal...

Private placement debt issues are more effective than public bonds in resolving information asymmetries and controlling moral hazard problems. Firms that issue only private placements (non-switchers) are found to have more information problems than firms that have access to the public bond...

Most studies of corporate investment assume perfect capital markets and ignore the influence of financing decisions on real investment. This paper explores whether capital market imperfections are helpful in explaining real corporate investment. I develop a variant of a q-theory model of...

In this paper we formulate and test a number of hypotheses regarding insurer participation and volume decisions in derivatives markets. Several specific hypotheses are supported by our analysis. We find evidence consistent with the idea that insurers are motivated to use financial derivatives to...

In this paper we investigate the extent to which insurance companies utilize financial derivatives contracts in the management of risks. The data set we employ allows us to observe the universe of individual insurer transactions for a class of contracts, namely, those normally through of as...