To isolate the impact of the assumption of model-consistent expectations, this paper proposes a baseline case in which households are individually rational, have full information and learn using forecast rules specified as in the minimum state variable representation of the economy. Applying...

We exploit a unique opportunity to study how a large population of players in the field learn to play a novel game with a complicated and non-intuitive mixed strategy equilibrium.  We argue that standard models of belief-based learning and reinforcement learning are unable to explain the data,...

We propose a simple payoff-based learning rule that is completely decentralized, and that leads to an efficient configuaration of actions in any n-person finite strategic-form game with generic payoffs.  The algorithm follows the theme of exploration versus exploitation and is hence stochastic...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability and character skills influence behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions.  We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and theevolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behaviorin a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitiveability: more cognitively...

Why do people stall while bargaining? Why are people keen to conclude a deal quickly, only to subsequently allow delay before the pie is realised? We propose that the reason is not fully explained by discount rates in combination with agents being engaged in a signalling equilibrium with...

This paper considers a simple adaptive learning rule in Bayesian games where players employ threshold strategies. Global convergence results are given for supermodular games and potentital games.

It is common to model costs of carrying out strategies in games in relation to the complexity, in some sense, of the strategies. We show a particularly general definition of complexity for this purpose, one that subsumes many alternatives as special cases. We explore how this definition can be...

The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is...

Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the "true" structure of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium, but they do not learn within it.  An alternative learning...