The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms of order p4 for...

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15],...

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation.It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outsidegroup deviation options.This type of distinction is not present in current...

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in a situation where coalitions impose externalities on other players. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay provided that any set of coalitions profit from merging. Even under this...

In this note we derive the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d.This first order derivative is completely specified in terms of the Pareto frontier function.We show that whenever one player increases his threatpoint always at least one player will...

This paper studies noncooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper single games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the...