it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in this …

stability. Nevertheless, an embedding into a one-to-one agent--slot matching market shows that stable outcomes exist and can be …

We show that an ambiguity in setting the primitives of the matching with contracts model by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005 …

ROTC's choice of a poorly behaved cadet-branch matching mechanism. Not only does the ROTC mechanism effectively block the …. Building on recent advances in matching markets, we propose a design that eliminates each of these deficiencies and also …

a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real-life matching problem fills an important gap in … cadets and the Army. This new application shows that matching with contracts model is practically relevant beyond traditional …