Training funds are used to incentivize training in developing countries, but the funds are based on payroll taxes that lower the return to training.  In the absence of training funds, larger, high-wage and more capital intensive firms are the most likely to offer training unless they are...

Many developing countries have tried to increase firm provision of training by providing subsidies funded by taxes proportional to the firm’s wage bill.  These training funds, however, may backfire if the adverse effect of the tax on training incentives outweighs the positive effects of...

This study uses an agent-based computational experiments to examine the effects of a non-employment payment on network formation and work-site behaviors among workers and employers participating in a sequential employment game with incomplete contracts. Findings are compared with those obtained...

This paper establishes that the profit-seeking activities of private intermediaries can ensure Pareto efficiency in the standard pure-exchange monetary overlapping generations economy without the need for government monetary or fiscal policy intervention. Moreover, these profit-seeking...

Why does the First Welfare Theorem fail in standard overlapping generations economies with production, such as Diamond (AER, 1965) and Tirole (Econometrica, 1985)? This study argues that the reason for this failure can be attributed to the passive intermediation role played by the Walrasian...