Although it is well known that trust is an important component of the fulfilment of incomplete contracts, less is known regarding how robust it is to past experiences.

Although much research has been devoted to the impact of seller structure on market outcomes, considerably less is known about the influence of buyer structure. We examine the impact of buyer concentration on the pricing of a monopolist. Markets with both two and four buyers achieve prices well...

We infer unobserved strategies from the observed actions of buyers in posted-offer market experiments to evaluate their effectiveness against a monopolist. While the strategies of one-quarter of the buyers in our experiments correspond to the game-theoretic prediction of passive price-taking,...

This paper is empirical study, using new experimental data, of repeated game strategies in trust games; its goal is to identify strategies that people use in repeated games. We develop a strategy inference method that maps observed actions to a set of best fitting unobserved repeated game...

We look at the links between the Digit Ratio - the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the ring finger – for both right and left hands, and giving in a Dictator Game. Unlike previous studies with exclusively Caucasian subjects, we recruited a large, ethnically diverse...

The single crossing property plays a crucial role in monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), yet in some important applications the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived.  Difficulties often arise because the property cannot be aggregated: the sum of two...

In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer's meeting...

The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors’ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by...

Speculative Attacks can be modeled as a coordination game with multiple equilibria if the state of the economy is common knowledge. With private information there is a unique equilibrium. This raises the question whether public information may be destabilizing by allowing for self-fulfilling...

Three experiments on utility interdependence are discussed. Subjects receive money by betting and possibly by arbitrary assignments. They can then pay to reduce and, possibly, redistribute the steal money; in one case, only the decisions of a randomly determined dictator are implemented. The...