Showing 1 - 10 of 41
We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011193604
In Medicare Part D, low income individuals receive subsidies to enroll into insurance plans. This paper studies how premiums are distorted by the combined effects of this subsidy and the default assignment of low income enrollees into plans. Removing this distortion could reduce the cost of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010559468
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604557
modeling agents who lack detailed knowledge of prior distributions. In auctions, that agents know priors has two consequences … such complex inferences are precluded. This is done in a parsimonious model of auctions in which agents are restricted to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822935
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102109
This paper experimentally analyzes the cartel coordination challenge induced by the discrimination of cartel ringleaders in leniency policies. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation of a cartel. A leniency policy which grants amnesty to all "whistleblowers"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164190
We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the antitrust agency applies a consumer surplus standard. Remedies increase the scope for profitable and acceptable mergers, while divestitures to an entrant firm are most effective in this regard....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957931
persistence. The firms either compete or collude in prices. The model shows that a reduction of demand may promote collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958041
This paper studies the institutional design of newspaper and periodical wholesale. Motivated by recent developments in Germany, we compare the efficiency properties of two alternative regimes for determining the wholesale margins: collective bargaining (as practised in Germany for the last...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986048