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Informational size and two-stage mechanisms
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015
We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011193604
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations, Second Version
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604557
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Simple Auctions, Second Version
Compte, Olivier; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2010
modeling agents who lack detailed knowledge of prior distributions. In auctions, that agents know priors has two consequences … such complex inferences are precluded. This is done in a parsimonious model of auctions in which agents are restricted to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822935
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196
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Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102109