We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts. Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient. We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output....

We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries...

This paper adopts a managerial accounting perspective to propose and empirically illustrate a research design for firm decision making based on performance feedback. In doing so, it operationalizes the theoretical frameworks based on the endogenous components of across-firms heterogeneous...

We systematically analyze how variations in board independence and ownership concentration and type affect corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing from the agency and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that recognizing differences in the distribution of costs and benefits to shareholders and...

This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency measures. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the...