This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting a technology from a pool of...

Following our previous study that established the concept of limited technology transferability, this paper analyses the equilibrium outcomes of two forms of research joint ventures (RJVs). The marginal analysis shows that market equilibria of perfect and imperfect RJVs result in a socially...

This paper considers the situation where some firms in an industry collude together as an RJV cartel to compete with other firms who individually engage in R&D. The analysis shows that this partial RJV cartelisation may increase market concentration. In comparison with pure R&D competition,...

This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting a technology from a pool of...