We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the...

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the...

Voting on unidimensional issues will produce equilibrium outcomes if voter preferences are single peaked. While the equilibrium outcomes would not necessarily be Pareto optimal, they would be stable. This paper shows that voting on multidimensional issues can produce stable equilibria if the...

This paper reviews public choice theories of interest groups.

ILO pub. Article analysing 1975 proposals for combining profit sharing with workers stock ownership made by sweden's trade union federation (lo) - presents brief comparison of wage earner funds in Western Europe and the USA, outlines essential features of the confederation proposal, emphasizing...

This paper applies the technique of Granger Causality to determine the relationship between total government expenditures and total tax revenue using annual revised estimates. The analysis discovers a firm unidirectional effect from expenditure to revenue suggesting the preference of controlling...