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This note gives explicit formulas for the non-expected utility Nash- as well as the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550936
In this paper the concept of total gross seigniorage is used to analyze sources and uses of central bank seigniorage revenues in the Czech Republic during the period 1993-1997. A comprehensive framework for measuring total gross seigniorage and its main components is presented and estimates of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561208
The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407626
In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means of direct coordination or the enforcement of pre-commitment devices such as contract laws.Credible threats of violence allow this role. In a local interaction model, an authority forms if mutually connected individuals with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412451
In this paper we consider the way in which authorities arise in response to the need for coordination. In a model of local interaction, an authority is understood as a self-enforcing coordination selection structure, where the threat of violence ensures compliance. Such authorities form if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550871
We consider a local interaction model with a population on an h dimensional torus, in which in each round of play a random player gets a learning draw. This player plays a k+1 action stage game with players in his neighborhood, compares his own average payoff with the average payoff of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118616