We examine whether two commonly used indicators of bank fragility, the subordinated debt spread and KMV’s distance to default, yield signals in line with supervisors’ interests. We argue that supervisors would prefer indicators that are strictly increasing in earnings, and decreasing in...

We analyse co-movements in the fragility of EU banks and verify to which extent such co-movements have increased in time, following, for example, the completion of Monetary Union and the introduction of the euro. To this end, we provide a measure of co-movements in bank risk by means of a...

Since the second half of the ‘70s, those institutions aimed at granting the banking and financial system stability (Central Banks, Supervisory Authorities, Deposit Insurance Systems, etc.) have been employing monitoring techniques in order to evaluate the situation of banks, some of which...

Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, what scope for flexibility in Tunisia? The adoption by Tunisia of structural reforms of its economy in a context of gradual opening since 1986, had allowed the instauration in January 1993 of the convertibility of its current...

The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has led certain regulatory authorities to prefer...

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff...

This paper characterizes interim efficient mechanisms for public good production and cost allocation in a two-type environment with risk neutral, quasi-linear preferences and fixed size projects, where the distribution of the private good, as well as the public goods decision, affects social...

We study the issue of project choice when a risk-averse agent must choose whether to invest in two projects of the same type (focus) or of different types (diversification). Projects of the same type are subject to common type-specific shocks. Hence focusing is more risky within each period, but...

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...

This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form is necessarily proper. If one fixes not only the equilibrium in question but also a a sequence of completely mixed strategies...