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Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental

Arévalo, Julián; Ojeda, Jair - EconWPA - 2004

This paper shows one type of asymetric information problems, their theorethical implications, the design of contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118595

Does the IMF cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data

Dreher, Axel; Vaubel, Roland - EconWPA - 2002

Using panel data for 106 countries in 1971-1997, we estimate generalized least squares regressions to explain IMF lending as well as monetary and fiscal policies in the recipient countries. With respect to moral hazard, we find that a country's rate of monetary expansion and its government...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408180

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Variable Skill Levels

Pollak, Andreas - EconWPA - 2004

I study the consequences of heterogeneity of skills for the design of an optimal unemployment insurance, using a principal-agent set-up with a risk neutral insurer and infinitely lived risk averse agents. Agents, who are characterised by different productivities or skills, are employed by firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408328

Dynamic Adjustment of Corporate Leverage: Is there a lesson to learn from the Recent Asian Crisis?

Driffield, Nigel; Mahambare, Vidya; Pal, Sarmistha - EconWPA - 2004

Much of the macro literature on the recent Asian crisis argues that a major cause was over borrowing and over investment encouraged by poor supervision and the resulting moral hazard problem. Surprisingly however there is little firm-level evidence to corroborate this. The present paper examines...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413165

Hidden Teacher Effort in Educational Production: Monitoring vs. Merit Pay

Jaag, Christian - EconWPA - 2005

This paper deals with the optimality of teacher incentive contracts in the presence of costly or limited government …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076924

Dynamic Adjustment of Corporate Leverage: Is there a lesson to learn from the Recent Asian Crisis?

Driffield, Nigel; Mahambare, Vidya; Pal, Sarmistha - EconWPA - 2005

While the aggregate macroeconomic analysis of the recent Asian Crisis highlights the moral hazard problem of bad loans in poorly supervised and regulated East Asian economies, there is very little firm-level analysis to characterize it. The present paper attempts to fill in this gap of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076955

How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structure and Firm Performance? Recent Evidence from East Asia

Driffield, Nigel; Mahambare, Vidya; Pal, Sarmistha - EconWPA - 2005

Despite the seminal work of Claessens et al. (2002), who highlighted the role of ownership structure on firm performance in East Asia, the relationship between capital structure and ownership remains much unexplored. This is important, given recent empirical and theoretical work linking capital...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076974

Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts

Braido, Luis H.B. - EconWPA - 2005

Ever since Adam Smith, share contracts have been condemned for their lack of incentives. Sharecropping tenants face …. This paper shows that: (i) share contracts are also associated with lower-quality lands; (ii) the sharecroppers' input … incentives) seems to be behind the existing evidence on the productive disadvantage of share contracts. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556067

IMF Bailouts and Moral Hazard

Lee, Jong-Wha; Shin, Kwanho - EconWPA - 2005

This paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with IMF bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the perceived probability of IMF bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis. We do not find strong evidence that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556610

Divide and Conquer

Chen, Zhijun - EconWPA - 2005

Tournaments are well known to be vulnerable to collusion as shown by the impossibility theorem in Ishiguro (2004), which asserts that efficient effort levels are impossible to be implemented through a collusion-proof contract. However, we argue that this impossibility is a product of simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556789