Showing 1 - 10 of 16
term costs of reputation damage. A directed search model is constructed in which submarkets are created by the … advertisements and reputations of sellers. A reputation system links misleading advertisements in the present period to a lower … reputation in the next period. We show that a reputation system always increases the prices of high quality products and directs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134460
We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513
his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413244
This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of implemented policies. I derive the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076606
his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076613
Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. We model this situation as a reputational cheap-talk game with continuous signal, state, and ability type spaces....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550867
A large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550888
The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550893
trust and cooperation through reputation and without an external enforcer is an open question. We therefore explore through …-shot trust game with a reputation mechanism. In every interaction, a buyer has complete information about a seller's past … the one hand, some minimal fraction of buyers must make use of the sellers’ reputation in their buying strategies and, on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556684
The Klein-Leffler (1981) model of product quality does not explain why high-quality firms would dissipate the rents they earn from quality- assuring price premia, and it relies on consumers knowing the cost functions of firms. In the present paper, consumers do not know any firm's cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561438