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A Very Simple Model of Conflict with Asymmetric Evaluations and Institutional Constraint

Caruso, Raul - EconWPA - 2005

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … conflict in order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. An institutional constraint is modelled through an exogenously … conflicting agents are willing to commit themselves to ease the conflict joining an institutional setting they do not ‘disarm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408438

Incentives and spillovers in R&D activities: an agency-theoretic analysis of industry-university relations

Lacetera, Nicola - EconWPA - 2003

In this paper, I study industry-university relations in a principal- agent framework. Following the existing literature, these relations are interpreted in two ways: (1) as occurring through spillovers of knowledge among different groups of researchers, working for different institutional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561799

Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

Laureti, Paolo; Slanina, Frantisek; Yu, Yi-Kuo; Zhang, … - EconWPA - 2003

We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial website gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407517

The Role of Contextual Clues in the Creation of Information Overload

Kimble, Chris; Hildreth, Paul; Grimshaw, David J - EconWPA - 2005

There has been an explosion of new forms of communications media for interpersonal communication. There is anecdotal evidence of people suffering from 'information overload' as a result of these developments. This paper presents the results from, and analysis of, a case study of a perceived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407519

Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention

Hirshleifer, David; LIM, SONYA SEONGYEON; Teoh, Siew Hong - EconWPA - 2004

In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allocate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are unrealistically optimistic. Nevertheless,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407521

The Political Economy of Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information

Dhami, Sanjit - EconWPA - 2001

This paper examines the political economy of redistribution when voters have asymmetric information about the redistributive preferences of politicians and the latter cannot make credible policy commitments. The candidates in each party are endogenously selected by a process of Nash Bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407535

Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement

Nicolo', Antonio; Tedeschi, Piero - EconWPA - 2004

. Hence this contract incompleteness arises as a screening device. Moreover, the threat of costly divorce is credible since … ex-post amicable agreement, under specific circumstances. We also investigate conditions that make this contract … incompleteness an optimal form of contracting and we briefly discuss the effects of enforceable and/or mandatory premarital …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407538

Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game

Harrison, Rodrigo J.; Munoz, Roberto - EconWPA - 2003

. Interestingly, the equilibrium selected is in conflict with those predicted by the traditional cooperative refinements. Moreover, we … get a conflict between stability and efficiency even when no such conflict exists with the cooperative refinements. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407549

Credible Communication in Dynastic Government

Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2002

This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in {\em dynastic governments}. It has been suggested that ``horizontal accountability," i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407554

Political renegotiation of regulatory contracts

Aubert, Cecile; Laffont, Jean- Jacques - EconWPA - 2005

strategically distort contracts to influence renegotiation outcomes. In this sequential common agency game, the initial contract … through partial information revelation (a `strategic' effect). We characterize the optimal initial contract, as a function of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407570