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We introduce cheap talk in a dynamic investment model with information externalities. We first show how social learning adversely affects the credibility of cheap talk messages. Next, we show how an informational cascade makes thruthtelling incentive compatible. A separating equilibrium only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118611
Models of herd behaviour and informational cascades were theoretically developed in 1992 respectively by Banerjee (A simple model of herd behavior) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades). Both articles pointed out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124961
For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanism that is designed to promote social efficiency. The mechanism links the various decisions by forcing agents to budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077065
considered. Three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134408
The current overview of bundling theory is combined with author's experiences of its practical application into several … bank as well. Application of bundling strategies in retail banking reduces a bank's variable cost for selling, secures both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134983
In environments where regulations are lax and controls function badly, cleanly participating in tenders is irrational. An increase in one single firm’s propensity to bribe induces the same behaviour upon the others (“bad apple effect”), and the likelihood of firms to bribe tends to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408440
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model with human capital accumulation to evaluate the economic consequences of compulsory services (such as military draft or social services). Our analysis identifies a so far ignored dynamic cost arising from distortions in time allocation over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412453
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller’s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413299
This note examines the Integrity Pact (IP) methodology proposed by Transparency International to confront the problem of corruption in public procurement. The examination draws from a decision model for participants developed elsewhere, in which the critical elements are shown to be the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556938
The prisoner’s dilemma is sometimes invoked to describe the situation facing participants in tenders. Reasoning on the basis of the dilemma metaphor, it is contended that agreeing not to bribe public officials in order to win contracts (collaboration) leads to better outcomes than bribing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125994