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Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests

Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - EconWPA - 2005

's messages. This confirms ``truth bias'' reported in communication theory in a one-shot, anonymous environment without nonverbal … under certain conditions. We claim that the theory for the evolution of language should address why truthful communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556670

A Model of Expertise

Krishna, Vijay; Morgan, John - EconWPA - 1999

We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550962

Professional Advice

Ottaviani, Marco; Sorensen, Peter - EconWPA - 1999

Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. We model this situation as a reputational cheap-talk game with continuous signal, state, and ability type spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550867

Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling

Feltovich, Nick; Harbaugh, Rick; To, Ted - EconWPA - 1998

In sender--receiver games high--quality types can distinguish themselves from low--quality types by sending a costly signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We examine equilibria where medium types separate themselves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550943

Market Power and Information Revelation in Dynamic Trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - EconWPA - 2002

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118623

" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived … by means of communication. When communication is costless and messages are sent simultaneously, communication mechanisms … or protocols exist that sustain the same set of equilibrium payoffs as in the standard repeated game. When communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603

Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism

Lagunoff, Roger; Matsui, Akihiko - EconWPA - 2001

This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between ongoing organizations. In each organization … the past can be communicated by one generation to the next through ``cheap talk" communication. With costly communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550938

Some Notes on Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2004

Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407536

False Reputation in a Society of Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541

Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there are no conflicting interests and subjects are organised in fixed pairs. This is so, even though a simple adjustment process would lead the subjects into the efficient, fair and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575