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The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information

Miller, David A. - EconWPA - 2005

In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608

The U-shaped Investment Curve: Theory and Evidence

Cleary, Sean; Povel, Paul; Raith, Michael - EconWPA - 2003

This paper examines how the investment of financially constrained firms varies with their level of internal funds. We … develop a theoretical model of optimal investment under financial constraints. Our model endogenizes the costs of external … investment is U-shaped. In particular, when a firm's internal funds are negative and sufficiently low, a further decrease leads …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413170

Capacity Markets for Electricity

Creti, Anna; Fabra, Natalia - EconWPA - 2003

The creation of electricity markets has raised the fundamental question as to whether markets provide the right incentives for the provision of the reserves needed to maintain system reliability, or whether some form of regulation is needed. In some states in the US, electricity retailers have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561380

Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle

Fabra, Natalia - EconWPA - 2003

This paper investigates the effect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand fluctuations. In the absence of capacity constraints (i.e. a limiting case of our model), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) show that firms find it more difficult...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125033

CIRCULAR VARIABLE WORK IN PROCESS

Vildosola, Luis - EconWPA - 2002

This work is focused on identifying a circular pull production control system (PPCS) and make emphasis on the presence of a stability attribute. It is an introductory paper to an extended study of macroeconomic financial stability in a physically open but systemic closed system. Previous work...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126234

The Other Side of Limited Liability: Predatory Behavior and Investment Timing

Bayer, Christian - EconWPA - 2004

This paper investigates the interplay of investment irreversibility, predatory behavior, and limited liability in a … duopoly with aggregate demand uncertainty. We find that limited liability and investment irreversibility is likely to produce … of all competitors determine the market price. If now investment is irreversible, it is a strong commitment. It hence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005134505

False Reputation in a Society of Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

Echenique, Federico - EconWPA - 2000

(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407571

Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games

Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997

We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601

" Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

Anderlini, Luca; Lagunoff, Roger - EconWPA - 2001

We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407603