This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2001) in a market where traders values are interdependent. It is shown that under reasonable conditions this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that...

Specialist merchants and traders---agents who mediate the transfer of goods and services between producers and consumers---are central to the economic process, but there are few theoretical models in which the institution of intermediation is an endogenous part of an equilibrium. This paper...

We propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases (i.e., one unit from each firm). This model fits many markets (e.g. newspapers, credit cards, scholarly journals, subscriptions to TV channels, etc.) better than existing models. A common feature of these...

This paper studies a competitive market model for trading indivisible commodities. Commodities can be desirable or undesirable. Agents' preferences depend on the bundle of commodities and the quantity of money they hold. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities in money. Using the...

In this paper, we study the incumbent's incentive to share its essential facility when there exist network effects. We show that without network effects, the incumbent will charge an access fee high enough to deter the entry. with network effects, however, the incumbent always has an incentive...

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade problem where the seller makes hidden investment that influences the buyer's private valuation. Complete contracts can be written on observable trade decisions. It is shown that efficiency level in investment and trade is negatively related to the scope of...

This paper reports an experiment involving two mechanisms that allocate a single unit of an indivisible private good among two players, at no cost to either of them. Both mechanisms, proposed by Moore (1992) and Perry and Reny (1999), are compared in terms of their relative performance to assign...

Field and experimental research demonstrate the positive relationship between efficiency and both trust and trustworthiness. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (BDM), 1995, first showed the existence and strength of both trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory economic experiment. Building off BDM,...

Multiplicity of Mixed Bayesian Equilibria in Mechanisms Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra The literature on implementation with incomplete information has often left out the consideration of mixed-strategy equilibria. This is particularly problematic for a research program that attempts to address...

I argue in favor of a competitive screening approach for studying the question of coalition formation in exchange economies under asymmetric information. I obtain a new notion of core that refines Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is nonempty under the standard regularity conditions. I also...