In this paper, we discuss the possibility of strategic behavior and truthful reporting in a two players' announcement game when there is a cost for getting information. First we show that the best strategy of each player is to announce the observed signal truthfully if the announcement is made...

We extend the $\Delta$-rationalizability (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi 2003) to infinite strategic form games with incomplete information. The most important feature of the $\Delta$-rationalizability is that there is no specified epistemic type space \`{a} la Harsanyi. However, we can impose a...

Self regulation is a mechanism of quality vigilance that is frequently used in credence good industries. The providers in these markets generally form a Self Regulated Organization (SRO), composed by some members of the industry, whose main job is to convince consumers through an active...

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may...

This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of...

Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...

One type of regulation that has recently started to attract the attention of policymakers regarding artisanal fisheries is that of Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the literature). TURFs basically consist in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and/or groups to fish...

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority can be optimal, using a model of a firm with three...

Most of the literature on auctions assumes that the auctioneer owns the object on sale. However most auctions are organized and run by an agent of the owner. This separation generates the possibility of corruption. We analyze the effect of a particular form of corruption on bidding behavior in a...

Networks and Farsighted Stability By Frank H. Page, Jr. Department of Finance University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA fpage@cba.ua.edu Myrna H. Wooders Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL UK M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk Samir Kamat Portfolio Management Group Wachovia...