contract to attain the asymptotic efficiency has the following features: (i) The wage schemes to some agents are contingent on …

profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents supply more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of … incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract …

profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents supply more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of … incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract …

organization, employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such delegation of authority can … two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the … where the principal can benefit from delegating authority to the manager, but not to the worker. Beneficial delegation …

options is derived as a second best optimal contract when his information acquisition technology is "success enhancing" and …

outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of authority. Hence, delegation can provide a way to manipulate the principal …'s ex post reputation. In general, the principal keeps the authority too often when she has the opportunity of delegation …

that such profitable delegation is possible and characterizes the agents to whom a given agent may delegate the …