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The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions

Lagunoff, Roger - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper formulates a model of dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Specifically, a class of dynamic political games (DPGs) is introduced in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. It is recursive because future political institutions are decided under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328876

Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design

Watson, Joel; Bull, Jesse - Econometric Society - 2004

In its standard “public choice” form, the mechanism-design framework abstracts from institutional and technological constraints beyond those that the modeler can represent in the definition of states, outcomes, and preferences. This abstraction can create a useful simplification. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063593

Status Quo Effects In Bargaining: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC

Hyndman, Kyle - Econometric Society - 2004

We conduct an event analysis on OPEC quota announcements to determine their impact on the stock returns in the oil industry. We find that announcements to reduce the quota are followed by positive excess returns over pre-announcement levels, announcements of no action are met with negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063722

Protective properties and the constrained equal awards rule for claims problems

Yeh, Chun-Hsien - Econometric Society - 2004

We investigate the implications of two properties, sustainability and exemption, when imposed separately in conjunction with other basic properties for the resolution of conflicting claims. Under the protective properties, agents with sufficiently small claims in relation to the others are fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702712

Strategic Decisions on Lawyers' Compensations in Civil Disputes

Kim, In-Gyu; Baik, Kyung Hwan - Econometric Society - 2004

We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which a plaintiff's lawyer works on a contingent fee basis but a defendant's lawyer on an hourly fee basis. We first derive the conditions under which delegation to the lawyers brings both the plaintiff and defendant more payoffs, compared to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342327

Bureaucratic Provision: Influencing vs. Lying

Vaidya, Samarth - Econometric Society - 2004

In this paper a public bureau can extract surplus value from the services it provides not only by misrepresenting its production costs to its oversight committee but also by influencing the perceptions of the legislative body such as the parliament or the congress and the public at large by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063617

Uncertainty and Resistance to Reform in Laboratory Participation Games

Mui, Vai-Lam; Cason, Timothy N. - Econometric Society - 2004

as a result of a reform can prevent its adoption. We introduce intra-group conflict into this framework by incorporating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063656

Off with their heads: Terrorism and electoral support for capital punishment in Australia

Fry, Tim R. L.; Felvus, Clare; Davidson, Sinclair; … - Econometric Society - 2004

Recent terrorist attacks such as the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 have generated new interest in the debate on capital punishment. It has been suggested that support for the death penalty could be higher in the wake of terrorist activity. Using data from the Australian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063657

Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium

Bó, Pedro Dal; Bó, Ernesto Dal - Econometric Society - 2004

, technology and endowments) will affect the intensity of social conflict over the distribution of resources. Examples of conflict … activities range from crime to civil war. We show that not all favorable shocks to an economy will reduce conflict, even when … conflict, while positive shocks to capital intensive industries will do just the opposite. The key requirement is that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063727

Party Polarization and Electoral Accountability

Testa, Cecilia - Econometric Society - 2004

In this paper we model the interaction between parties and candidates to highlight the mechanisms by which parties selecting candidates may discipline legislators. Parties are long-lived institutions providing incentives to short-lived candidates. Citizens have preferences over a multimentional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699610