Similar Search Results

The Strategic Impact of Pace in Double Auction Bargaining

Gjerstad, Steven - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model ("automated sellers") maximize the seller's expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief function,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063604

Coalition Formation and Asymmetric Information in a Legislative Bargaining Game

Tsai, Tsung-Sheng - Econometric Society - 2004

To investigate players' incentives in coalition formation, we consider a legislative bargaining game with asymmetric information about time preferences. The force that does not exist in usual bargaining games with unanimity is that due to majority rule, if a player signals himself as the patient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342329

Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal

Gresik, Thomas A.; Bond, Eric W. - Econometric Society - 2004

Consider the case of a firm with private valuation information bargaining with a supplier over the price and quantity of a good. If the firm and the supplier bargain directly, the bargaining outcome may not yield a first-best outcome due to the presence of information rents. The question we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328937

Optimal Common Value Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders

Singh, Rajdeep; Povel, Paul - Econometric Society - 2004

How do informational asymmetries between bidders affect the outcome of common value auctions? Should the seller accept bids from bidders with more precise information? If so, under what conditions? What effect do such asymmetries have on the seller’s expected revenue? We analyze these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699653

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Morris, Stephen; Fang, Hanming - Econometric Society - 2004

We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699666

Optimal Allocation Mechanisms When Bidders Ranking for the objects is common

Feng, Juan - Econometric Society - 2004

Search engines commonly use â€œsponsored linksâ€, where certain advertisersâ€™ links are promoted to be placed above others in return for monetary payment. It is natural to assume that all providers value a higher ranked placement more than lower ranked ones. Then how should the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702600

Endogenous Asymmetry and Entry in Sequential Multi-Unit Auctions: Identification and Estimation

Gupta, Sudip - Econometric Society - 2004

This paper analyzes bidding behavior in a multi period multiple unit auction. While bidders are ex ante symmetric, the first period outcome translates the second period game to a game between asymmetric bidders. The first period outcome determines who will be a strong or a weak bidder in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702642

Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions

McAdams, David - Econometric Society - 2004

Existence of monotone pure strategy equilibrium is established in the discriminatory and uniform S + a-th price (a in [0, 1]) auctions of S identical objects when bidders are risk-neutral with independent signals. The model requires discrete price / quantity grids and allows for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342189

Ordinal Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions

Chakraborty, Archishman; Gupta, Nandini - Econometric Society - 2004

Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328976

A Theoretical Foundation for Bilateral Matching Mechanisms

Aliprantis, C.D.; Camera, G. - Econometric Society - 2004

This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of bilateral matching mechanisms and studies their properties … in a systematic manner. By providing a unified framework to study ilateral matching mechanisms, we formalize how … different spatial/informational constraints can be implemented via a careful selection of matching mechanisms. In particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063736