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Time is not money
Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2006
Casual observation suggests that people are more generous with their time than with their money. In this paper we present experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis. A third of our subjects demand no compensation for non-monetary investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771168
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Trust and truth
Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Lilja, Jannie; … - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2006
game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values (sealed-bid double auction) bargaining game with or without … communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma …, but has no significant effect on bargaining outcomes when one subject defected. Subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649129
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Delegation of Bargaining and Power
Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1998
Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771176
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Subordinates as Threats to Leaders
Glazer, Amihai; Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001
subordinate reduces the cost to the owner of a firm in replacing the leader, and so reduces the leader's bargaining power. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649276
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Patience and Ultimatum in Bargaining
Segendorff, Björn - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2001
remaining player becomes residual claimant. If no ultimatums are made then there is a Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining. Relative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649308
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Gender and Cooperation in Children: Experiments in Colombia and Sweden
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo; Dreber, Anna; von Essen, Emma; … - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2011
This paper compares cooperation among Columbian and Swedish children aged 9-12. We illustrate the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma in a new task that is easily understood by children and performed during a physical education class. We find some evidence that children cooperate more in Sweden...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914360
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In Bloom: Gender Differences in Preferences among Adolescents
Dreber, Anna; von Essen, Emma; Ranehill, Eva - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2011
We look at gender differences among adolescents in Sweden in preferences for altruism, risk and competition. We find that girls are more altruistic and less risk taking than boys. No gender differences are found comparing competitive performance with non-competitive performance in either a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008919577
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Do People Care about Social Context? Framing Effects in Dictator Games
Dreber, Anna; Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; … - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2011
Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. Usually these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In this Dictator game study, we investigate whether social framing effects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323350
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Gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking: comparing children in Colombia and Sweden
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo; Dreber, Anna; von Essen, Emma; … - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2010
We explore gender differences in preferences for competition and risk among children aged 9-12 in Colombia and Sweden, two countries differing in gender equality according to macro indices. We include four types of tasks that vary in gender stereotyping when looking at competitiveness: running,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693106
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Dominance and Submission: Social Status Biases Economic Sanctions
von Essen, Emma; Ranehill, Eva - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2011
Social hierarchy is persistent in all almost all societies. Social norms and their enforcement are part of sustaining hierarchical systems. This paper combines social status and norm enforcement, by introducing status in a dictator game with third party punishment. Status is conveyed by surname;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788636