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Kets, Willemien (contributor); Voorneveld, Mark (contributor) - 2005 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002640702

Prisoners' other dilemma

Blonski, Matthias (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner …-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated by non-cooperation (according to the Harsanyi … dominance ; Repeated games ; Equilibrium selection ; Cooperation ; Collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600066

The cutting power of preparation

Tercieux, Olivier (contributor); … - 2005 - [Elektronische Ressource]

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002552658

Group selection and social preferences

Weibull, Jörgen (contributor); … - 2005 - [Elektronische Ressource], Rev. September 27, 2005

preferences ; altruism ; fairness …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002609559

Preparation and toolkit learning

Voorneveld, Mark (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001638116

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Voorneveld, Mark (contributor); Kets, Willemien (contributor) - 2005 - [Elektronische Ressource], This version: March 23, 2005

Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002622655

The value of private safety versus the value of public safety

Johannesson, Magnus; Johansson, Per-Olov; O'Conor, … - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000931950

Essays on altruism and health care markets

Persson, Björn - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001582786

Markets and cooperation

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993262

Stochastic better-supply dynamics in games

Josephson, Jens (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]

In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600008