We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision.

This paper analyzes the effect of spillovers and congestion of local public goods on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdiction. Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction and produce a local public good, that creates positive spillovers in other...

We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive...

We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically,...

We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant...

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Some labor markets have recently developed formal signalling mechanisms, e.g. the signalling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game of incomplete information between firms and...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled...

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...