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Profit Sharing under the Threat of Nationalization

Corato, Luca Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

A government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a multinational corporation to extract a natural resource. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share on the profits. The host country provides access and guarantee conditions of operation. Being the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489589

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights …. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked … efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

Ansink, Erik; Ruijs, Arjan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice … of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance … of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990049

Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity Market

Lise, Wietze; Kemfert, Claudia; Tol, Richard S.J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

Nowadays, a process can be observed in Germany where electricity producing and trading firms react to the electricity market liberalisation by merging market shares, since the year 2000, which reduces the number of suppliers and influences production and consumer prices. This paper discusses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570351

An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability

Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Siniscalchi, Marciano - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 1999

We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterisation of extensive form rationalisability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423192

On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation

Haag, Matthew; Lagunoff, Roger - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much” cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423275

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Finus, Micheal - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385371

Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol

Carraro, Carlo; Buchner, Barbara - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385383

Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies

Marini, Marco; Currarini, Sergio - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385412

Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups

Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

A model of group formation is presented where the number of groups is fixed and a person can only join a group if the group’s members approve the person’s joining. Agents have either local status preferences (each agent wants to be the highest status agent in his group) or global status...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385469