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Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474
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Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?
Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
the defence of the opponent. This model has many applications like political campaigning, wars, competition among lobbies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068
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On the Timing of Political Regime Changes: Theory and Application to the Arab Spring
Boucekkine, Raouf; Prieur, Fabien; Puzon, Klarizze - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014
We develop a continuous time dynamic game to provide with a benchmark theory of Arab Spring-type events. We consider a resource-dependent economy with two interacting groups, the elite vs. the citizens, and two political regimes, dictatorship vs. a freer regime. Transition to the freer regime...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011162054
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Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade
Jackson, Matthew O.; Nei, Stephen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014
We investigate the role of networks of military alliances in preventing or encouraging wars between groups of countries. A country is vulnerable to attack if there is some fully-allied group of countries that can defeat that country and its (remaining) allies based on a function of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781879
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Group Bargaining and Conflict
Quérou, Nicolas - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata … which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674333
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Rent Seekers in Rentier States: When Greed Brings Peace
Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural … source of conflict and the rentier state view which emphasizes the role of resource rents in promoting peace and stability … activate more interest groups in a power struggle. We demonstrate that the associated increased cost of conflict may in fact …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467319
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North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
Caparrós, Alejandro; Pereau, Jean-Christophe; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570304
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Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation
Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Berghammer, Rudolf; Swart, Harrie de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230883
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Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: A Network Approach
Vega-Redondo, Fernando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may succeed in building up its “social capital” by establishing a stable and dense pattern of interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection of infinitely repeated Prisoner’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423105
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On Coalition Formation with Heterogeneous Agents
Caparrós, Alejandro; Hammoudi, Abdelhakim; Tazdaït, Tarik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423198