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Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias
Currarini, Sergio; Menge, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park Campus and Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552188
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(Anti-) Coordination in Networks
Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, José Gabriel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467327
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Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games
Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828406
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Coordination in Networks Formation: Experimental Evidence on Learning and Salience
Galizzi, Matteo; Bernasconi, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
coordination problems. We conduct experiments under various conditions which control for salient labeling and learning dynamics … various learning rules, which include as the main ones Reinforcement and Fictitious Play. …We present experiments on repeated non-cooperative network formation games, based on Bala and Goyal (2000). We treat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385417
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Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation
Mantovani, Marco; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Mauleon, Ana; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131101
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In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents
Ule, Aljaž; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423187
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Environmental Quality in a Differentiated Duopoly
Farzin, Y. Hossein; Akao, Ken-Ichi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
In a duopoly industry with environmentally differentiated products, we examine the effects of introducing a mandatory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392562
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Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition
André, Francisco J.; Castro, Luis M. de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2015
It has been shown in prior research that cost effectiveness in the competitive emissions permit market could be affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze these cross market links using a Stackelberg model to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011162046
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Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret
Gallice, Andrea - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe players’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385407
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Abuse of Competitive Fringe
Capuano, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423128