Similar Search Results

Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric information on Private Environmental Benefits

Anthon, Signe; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423251

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme

Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille; Poudou, Jean-Christophe; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

compare two types of contracts: a deforestation performance-based contract and a conditional avoided deforestation …-based contract. Because of the implementation and transaction costs, each kind of REDD+ contract implies a dramatically different … information rent/efficiency trade-off. If the contract is performance-based (resp. conditionality-based), information rents are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603765

Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement

Ray, Debraj; Eliaz, Kfir; Razin, Ronny - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423100

Past Performance Evaluation in Repeated Procurement: A Simple Model of Handicapping

Cesi, Berardino; Albano, Gian Luigi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts …. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423150

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents

Ule, Aljaž; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423187

Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

Lin, Tun; Goeschl, Timo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385328

Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited

Mensink, Paul - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme (‘differential tax’) introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385420

Monopoly with Resale

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385437

Endogenous Price Mechanisms,Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence

Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385490