Showing 1 - 10 of 149
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … network or only on the link itself. A final aspect is whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming … related either to accounting for a specific type of externality, or to dealing with the combinatorial nature of network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network … structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of … alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423065
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and … to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network … networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987229
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230850
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230874
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394