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Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment
Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the … explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming … the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667907
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Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667903
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At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door. Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool
Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus; … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010
that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast … calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average … improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574249
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The People’s Hired Guns? Experimentally Testing the Inclination of Prosecutors to Abuse the Vague Definition of Crimes
Engel, Christoph; Pluta, Alicja - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011
Legal realists expect prosecutors to be selfish. If they get the defendant convicted, this helps them advance their careers. If the odds of winning on the main charge are low, prosecutors have a second option. They can exploit the ambiguity of legal doctrine and charge the defendant for vaguely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009226923
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Words Substitute Fists – Justifying Punishment in a Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
Punishees regularly ask for justification. But is justification also effective? To answer this question under controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does not benefit from contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963
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Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations : A Large-Scale Experiment With a Representative Subject Pool
van soest, arthur; Bellemare, C.; Kroger, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007
We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091035
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We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision
Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009
Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614920
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Goals (th)at Work – Goals, Monetary Incentives, and Workers’ Performance
Goerg, Sebastian; Kube, Sebastian - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012
In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the connection between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, but effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010584376
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Time as a Medium of Reward in Three Social Preference Experiments
Noussair, Charles; Stoop, J.T.R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012
Abstract: We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090374
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Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery
Engel, Christoph; Goerg, Sebastian; Yu, Gaoneng - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012
In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010671660