This paper follows up on the Executive Board's December 2002 discussion of the design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism and seeks to make further progress on the formulation of a concrete proposal for a statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism

This paper takes stock of past episodes of debt restructuring and reviews the relevant literature. Based on cross-country experience from the late 1990s through 2010 of emerging markets it offers some stylized facts

This paper identifies contractual reforms designed to address collective action problems in sovereign debt restructuring. Since any decisions regarding the design of contractual provisions will need to be made by the sovereign issuer and its creditors, it is recognized that the Fund's primary...

This paper employs a dynamic bargaining-theoretic framework to analyze multilateral sovereign debt rescheduling negotiations. The analysis illustrates how various factors, such as the debtor’s gains from trade and the level of world interest rates, affect the relative bargaining power of...

What difference does it make, and for whom, whether the nonperforming debts of emerging market borrowers are restructured? This paper begins by positing a set of counterfactual conditions under which restructuring would not matter, and then shows how several ways in which the actual world of...

In this paper we analyze the recent efforts of the international financial institutions to limit the moral hazard created by their assistance to crisis countries. We question the wisdom of the case-by-case approach taken in Pakistan, Ecuador, Romania and Ukraine. We show that because default and...

We examine the implications for borrowing costs of including collective-action clauses in loan contracts. For a sample of some 2,000 international bonds, we compare the spreads on bonds subject to UK governing law, which typically include collective-action clauses, with spreads on bonds subject...